Abstract. We consider infinite-state turn-based stochastic games of two players, and , who aim at maximizing and minimizing the expected total reward accumulated along a run, respectively. Since the total accumulated reward is unbounded, the determinacy of such games cannot be deduced directly from Martin's determinacy result for Blackwell games. Nevertheless, we show that these games are determined both for unrestricted (i.e., history-dependent and randomized) strategies and deterministic strategies, and the equilibrium value is the same. Further, we show that these games are generally not determined for memoryless strategies. Then, we consider a subclass of -finitely-branching games and show that they are determined for all of the considered strategy types, where the equilibrium value is always the same. We also examine the existence and type of (ε-)optimal strategies for both players.
A game objective is usually specified by a payoff function which assigns some real value to every run (infinite path) in the game graph. The aim of Player is to maximize the expected payoff, while Player aims at minimizing it. It has been shown in [22] that for bounded and Borel payoff functions, Martin's determinacy result for Blackwell games [23] 
where HR and HR are the classes of HR strategies for Player and Player , respectively. Hence, every vertex v has a HR value Val HR (v) specified by (1) . A HR strategy is optimal if it achieves the outcome Val HR (v) or better against every strategy of the other player. In general, optimal strategies are not guaranteed to exist, but (1) implies that both players have ε-optimal HR strategies for every ε > 0 (see Section 2 for precise definitions).
The determinacy results of [23, 22] cannot be applied to unbounded payoff functions, i.e., these results do not imply that (1) holds if Payoff is unbounded, and they do not say anything about the existence of a value for restricted strategy classes such as MD or MR. In the context of performance analysis and controller synthesis, these questions rise naturally; in some cases, the players cannot randomize or remember the history of a play, and some of the studied payoff functions are not bounded. In this paper, we study these issues for the total accumulated reward payoff function and infinite-state games.
The total accumulated reward payoff function, denoted by Acc, is defined as follows. Assume that every vertex v is assigned a fixed non-negative reward r (v) . Then Acc assigns to every run the sum of rewards all vertices visited along the run. Obviously, Acc is unbounded in general, and may even take the ∞ value. A special case of total accumulated reward is termination time, where all vertices are assigned reward 1, except for terminal vertices that are assigned reward 0 (we also assume that the only outgoing transition of every terminal vertex t is a self-loop on t). Then, E σ,π v [Acc] corresponds to the expected termination time under the strategies σ, π. Another special (and perhaps simplest) case of total accumulated reward is reachability, where the target vertices are assigned reward 1 and the other vertices have zero reward (here we assume that every target vertex has a single outgoing transition to a special state s with zero reward, where s → s is the only outgoing transition of s). Although the reachability payoff is bounded, some of our negative results about the total accumulated reward hold even for reachability (see below).
The reason for considering infinite-state games is that many recent works study various algorithmic problems for games over classical automata-theoretic models, such as pushdown automata [15, 16, 17, 14, 9, 8] , lossy channel systems [3, 2] , one-counter automata [7, 5, 6] , or multicounter automata [18, 11, 10, 21, 12, 4] , which are finitely representable but the underlying game graph is infinite and sometimes even infinitelybranching (see, e.g., [11, 10, 21] ). Since the properties of finite-state games do not carry over to infinite-state games in general (see, e.g., [20] ), the above issues need to be revisited and clarified explicitly, which is the main goal of this paper.
Our contribution: We consider general infinite-state games, which may contain vertices with infinitely many outgoing transitions, and -finitely-branching games, where every vertex of V has finitely many outgoing transitions, with the total accumulated reward objective. For general games, we show the following:
-Every vertex has both a HR and a HD value, and these values are equal 1 . -There is a vertex v of a game G with reachability objective such that v has neither MD nor MR value. Further, the game G has only one vertex (belonging to Player ) with infinitely many outgoing transitions.
It follows from previous works (see, e.g., [8, 20] ) that optimal strategies in general games may not exist, and even if they do exist, they may require infinite memory. Interestingly, we observe that an optimal strategy for Player (if it exists) may also require randomization in some cases.
For -finitely-branching games, we prove the following results:
-Every vertex has a HR, HD, MR, and MD value, and all of these values are equal.
-Player has an optimal MD strategy in every vertex.
It follows from the previous works that Player may not have an optimal strategy and even if he has one, it may require infinite memory. Let us note that in finite-state games, both players have optimal MD strategies (see, e.g., [19] ). Our results are obtained by generalizing the arguments for reachability objectives presented in [8] , but there are also some new observations based on original ideas and new counterexamples. In particular, this applies to the existence of a HD value and the non-existence of MD and MR values in general games.
Preliminaries
In this paper, the sets of all positive integers, non-negative integers, rational numbers, real numbers, and non-negative real numbers are denoted by N, N 0 , Q, R, and R ≥0 , respectively. We also use R ≥0 ∞ to denote the set R ≥0 ∪ {∞}, where ∞ is treated according to the standard conventions. For all c ∈ R ≥0 ∞ and ε ∈ [0, ∞), we define the lower and upper ε-approximation of c, denoted by c ⊖ ε and c ⊕ ε, respectively, as follows:
Given a set V, the elements of (R For every finite or countably infinite set M, a binary relation
X that includes X and is closed under complement and countable union. A measurable space is a pair (X, F ) where X is a set called sample space and F is a σ-field over X. A probability measure over a measurable space (X, F ) is a function P : F → R ≥0 such that, for each countable collection {X i } i∈I of pairwise disjoint elements of F , P( i∈I X i ) = i∈I P(X i ), and moreover P(X) = 1. A probability space is a triple (X, F , P) where (X, F ) is a measurable space and P is a probability measure over (X, F ).
where V is a finite or countably infinite set of vertices, → ⊆ V × V is a total transition relation, (V , V , V ) is a partition of V, and Prob is a probability assignment which to each v ∈ V assigns a positive probability distribution on the set of its outgoing transitions. We say that G is -finitely-branching if for each v ∈ V there are only finitely many u ∈ V such that v → u.
Strategies.
A stochastic game G is played by two players, and , who select the moves in the vertices of V and V , respectively. Let ⊙ ∈ { , }. A strategy for Player ⊙ in G is a function which to each finite path in G ending a vertex v ∈ V ⊙ assigns a probability distribution on the set of outgoing transitions of v. We say that a strategy τ is memoryless (M) if τ(w) depends just on the last vertex of w, and deterministic (D) if it returns a Dirac distribution for every argument. Strategies that are not necessarily memoryless are called history-dependent (H), and strategies that are not necessarily deterministic are called randomized (R). Thus, we obtain the MD, MR, HD, and HR strategy types. The set of all strategies for Player ⊙ of type T in a game G is denoted by T G ⊙ , or just by T ⊙ if G is understood (for example, MR denotes the set of all MR strategies for Player ).
Every pair of strategies (σ, π) ∈ HR × HR and an initial vertex v determine a unique probability space (Run(v), F , P σ,π v ), where F is the σ-field over Run(v) generated by all Run(w) such that w starts with v, and P σ,π v is the unique probability measure such that for every finite path w = v 0 , . . . , v k initiated in v we have that P Determinacy, optimal strategies. In this paper, we consider games with the total accumulated reward objective and reachability objective, where the latter is understood as a restricted form of the former (see below).
Let r : V → R ≥0 be a reward function, and Acc : Run → R ≥0 ∞ a function which to every run ω assigns the total accumulated reward Acc(ω) = ∞ i=0 r(ω(i)). Let T be a strategy type. We say that a vertex v ∈ V has a T -value in G if
where E Let G be a class of games. If every vertex of every G ∈ G has a T -value for every reward function, we say that G is T -determined. Note that Acc is generally not bounded, and therefore we cannot directly apply the results of [23, 22] to conclude that the class of all games is HR-determined. Further, these results do not say anything about determinacy for the other strategy types even for bounded objective functions.
If a given vertex v has a T -value, we can define the notion of ε-optimal T strategy for both players.
Definition 2. Let v be a vertex which has a T -value, and let
A 0-T -optimal strategy is called T -optimal.
In this paper we also consider reachability objectives, which can be seen as a restricted form of the total accumulated reward objectives introduced above. A "standard" definition of the reachability payoff function looks as follows: We fix a set R ⊆ V of target vertices, and define a function Reach : Run → {0, 1} which to every run assigns either 1 or 0 depending on whether or not the run visits a target vertex. Note that E σ,π v [Reach] is the probability of visiting a target vertex in the corresponding play of G. Obviously, if we assign reward 1 to the target vertices and 0 to the others, and replace all outgoing transitions of target vertices with a single transition leading to a fresh stochastic vertex u with reward 0 and only one transition
in the modified game. Further, if the original game was -finitely-branching or finite, then so is the modified game. Therefore, all "positive" results about the total accumulated reward objective (e.g., determinacy, existence of T -optimal strategies, etc.) achieved in this paper carry over to the reachability objective, and all "negative" results about reachability carry over to the total accumulated reward. 
Results
Our main results about the determinacy of general stochastic games with the total accumulated reward payoff function are summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Let G be the class of all games. Then a) G is both HR-determined and HD-determined. Further, for every vertex v of every G ∈ G and every reward function r we have that Val HR (v) = Val HD (v). b) G is neither MD-determined nor MR-determined, and these results hold even for reachability objectives.
An optimal strategy for Player does not necessarily exist, even if G is a game with a reachability payoff function such that V = ∅ and every vertex of V has at most two outgoing transitions (see, e.g., [8, 20] ). In fact, it suffices to consider the vertex v of Fig. 2 where the depicted game is modified by replacing the vertex u with a stochastic vertex u ′ , where u ′ → u ′ is the only outgoing transition of u ′ , and u ′ is the only target vertex (note that all vertices in the first two rows become unreachable and can be safely deleted). Clearly, Val HR (v) = 1, but Player has no optimal strategy.
Similarly, an optimal strategy for Player may not exist even if V = ∅ [8, 20] . To see this, consider the vertex u of Fig. 2 , where t is the only target vertex and the depicted game is modified by redirecting the only outgoing transition of p back to u (this makes all vertices in the last two rows unreachable). We have that Val HR (u) = 0, but Player has no optimal strategy.
One may be also tempted to think that if Player (or Player ) has some optimal strategy, then he also has an optimal MD strategy. However, optimal strategies generally require infinite memory even for reachability objectives (this holds for both players). Since the corresponding counterexamples are not completely trivial, we refer to [20] for details. Interestingly, an optimal strategy for Player may also require randomization. Consider the vertex v of Fig. 1 . Let σ * ∈ MR be a strategy selecting v → q n with probability 1/2 n . Since V = ∅, we have that inf π∈HR E
For -finitely-branching games, the situation is somewhat different, as our second main theorem reveals.
Theorem 4. Let G be the class of all -finitely-branching games. Then G is HR-determined, HD-determined, MR-determined, and MD-determined, and for every vertex v of every G ∈ G and every reward function r we have that
Val HR (v) = Val HD (v) = Val MR (v) = Val MD (v) .
Further, for every G ∈ G there exists a MD strategy for Player which is optimal in every vertex of G.
An optimal strategy for Player may not exist in -finitely-branching games, and even if it does exist, it may require infinite memory [20] .
Theorems 3 and 4 are proven by a sequence of lemmas presented below. For the rest of this section, we fix a stochastic game G = (V, → , (V , V , V ), Prob) and a reward function r : V → R ≥0 . We start with the first part of Theorem 3 (a), i.e., we show that every vertex has a HR-value. This is achieved by defining a suitable Bellman operator L and proving that the least fixed-point of L is the tuple of all HR-values. More precisely,
is defined as follows:
A proof of the following lemma can be found in Appendix A. Some parts of this proof are subtle, and we also need to make several observations that are useful for proving the other results.
Lemma 5. The operator L has the least fixed point K (w.r.t. ⊑) and for every v ∈ V we have that
Moreover, for every ε > 0 there is π ε ∈ HD such that for every v ∈ V we have that
To complete our proof of Theorem 3 (a), we need to show the existence of a HD-value in every vertex, and demonstrate that HR and HD values are equal. Due to Lemma 5, for every ε > 0 there is π ε ∈ HD such that π ε is ε-HR-optimal in every vertex. Hence, it suffices to show the same for Player . The following lemma is proved in Appendix B.
Lemma 6. For every ε > 0, there is σ ε ∈ HD such that σ ε is ε-HR-optimal in every vertex.
The next lemma proves Item (b) of Theorem 3. Fig. 2 , where t is the only target vertex and all probability distributions assigned to stochastic states are uniform. Then
Lemma 7. Consider the vertex v of the game shown in
Proof. We start by proving item (a) for MD strategies. Let σ * ∈ MD . We show that
Let us fix an arbitrarily small ε > 0. We show that there is a suitable π * ∈ MD such that E
If the probability of reaching the vertex u from v under the strategy σ * is at most ε, we are done. Otherwise, let p s be the probability of visiting the vertex s from v under the strategy σ without passing through the vertex u. Note that p s > 0 and p s does not depend on the strategy chosen by Player . The strategy π * selects a suitable successor of u such that the probability p t of visiting the vertex t from u without passing through the vertex v satisfies p t /p s < ε (note that p t can be arbitrarily small but positive). Then
For MR strategies, the argument is the same. Item (b) is proven similarly. We show that for all π * ∈ MD and 0 < ε < 1 there exists a suitable σ * ∈ MD such that E
Let p t be the probability of visiting t from u without passing through the vertex v under the strategy π * . We choose the strategy σ * so that the probability p s of visiting the vertex s from v without passing through the vertex u satisfies p s /p t < ε. Note almost all runs initiated in v eventually visit either s or t under (σ * , π * ). Since the probability of visiting s is bounded by ε (the computation is similar to the one of item (a)), we obtain E
For MR strategies, the proof is almost the same. 1. for all v ∈ V and ε > 0, there is σ ε ∈ MD such that σ ε is ε-HR-optimal in v; 2. there is π ∈ MD such that π is HR-optimal in every vertex.
As an immediate corollary to Proposition 8, we obtain the following result: Corollary 9. If G is -finitely-branching, V is finite, and every vertex of V has finitely many successors, then there is σ ∈ MD such that σ is HR-optimal in every vertex.
Proof. Due to Proposition 8, for every vertex v and every ε > 0, there is σ ε ∈ MD such that σ ε is ε-HR-optimal in v. Since V is finite and every vertex of V has only finitely many successors, there are only finitely many MD-strategies for Player . Hence, there is a MD strategy σ that is ε-HR-optimal in v for infinitely many ε from the set {1, 1/2, 1/4, . . . }. Such a strategy is clearly HR-optimal in v. Note that σ is HR-optimal in every vertex which can be reached from v under σ and some strategy π for Player . For the remaining vertices, we can repeat the argument, and thus eventually produce a MD strategy that is HR-optimal in every vertex. Hence, if all non-stochastic vertices have finitely many successors and V is finite, then both players have HR-optimal MD strategies. This can be seen as a (tight) generalization of the corresponding result for finite-state games [19] .
The rest of this section is devoted to a proof of Proposition 8. We start with Item 1. The strategy σ ε is constructed by employing discounting. Assume, w.l.o.g., that rewards are bounded by 1 (if they are not, we may split every state v with a reward r(v) into a sequence of ⌈r(v)⌉ states, each with the reward r(v)/⌈r(v)⌉). Given λ ∈ (0, 1), define Acc λ : Run → R ≥0 to be a function which to every run ω assigns Acc
Lemma 10. For λ sufficiently close to one we have that
Proof. We show that for every ε > 0 there is n ≥ 0 such that the expected reward that Player may accumulate up to n steps is ε-close to Val HR (v) no matter what Player is doing. Formally, define Acc k : Run → R ≥0 to be a function which to every run ω assigns Acc k (ω) = k i=0 r(ω(i)). The following lemma is proved in Appendix C. Lemma 11. If G is -finitely-branching, then for every v ∈ V there is n ∈ N such that
Clearly, if λ is close to one, then for every run ω we have that
Thus,
This proves Lemma 10. ⊓ ⊔ So, it suffices to find a MD strategy σ ε satisfying
We define such a strategy as follows. Let us fix some ℓ ∈ N satisfying
Intuitively, the discounted reward accumulated after ℓ steps can be at most ε 8 . In a given vertex v ∈ V , the strategy σ ε chooses a fixed successor vertex u satisfying
Now we show that
which finishes the proof of Item 1 of Proposition 8. For every k ∈ N we denote by σ k a strategy for Player defined as follows: For the first k steps the strategy makes the same choices as σ ε , i.e., chooses, in each state v ∈ V , a next state u satisfying
From k+1-st step on, say in a state u, the strategy follows some strategy ζ satisfying
(Intuitively, the error of each of the first k steps is at most ε k·4 and thus the total error of the first k steps is at most k · ε k·4 = ε 4 . The rest has the error at most ε 8 and thus the total error is at most 3ε 8 .) We consider k = ℓ (recall that
Here the first equality follows from the fact that σ k behaves similarly to σ ε on the first k = ℓ steps and the discounted reward accumulated after k steps is at most ε 8 . The second inequality follows from Equation (2) .
It remains to prove Item 2 of Proposition 8. The MD strategy π can be easily constructed as follows: In every state v ∈ V , the strategy π chooses a successor u minimizing Val HR (u) among all successors of v. We show in Appendix D that this is indeed an optimal strategy.
Conclusions
We have considered infinite-state stochastic games with the total accumulated reward objective, and clarified the determinacy questions for the HR, HD, MR, and MD strategy types. Our results are almost complete. One natural question which remains open is whether Player needs memory to play ε-HR-optimally in general games (it follows from the previous works, e.g., [8, 20] , that ε-HR-optimal strategies for Player require infinite memory in general).
Technical Appendix

A Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5. The operator L has the least fixed point K (w.r.t. ⊑) and for every v ∈ V we have that
The partially ordered set ((R ≥0 ∞ ) V , ⊑), where ⊑ is a standard componentwise ordering, is a complete lattice. Moreover, from the definition of L we can easily see that L is
Thus, by the Knaster-Tarski theorem the operator L has the least fixed point, which we denote by K.
In order to prove that K v = Val HR (v) for every v ∈ V, it suffices to prove the following:
The second inequality holds trivially, so it suffices to prove the remaining ones.
To prove the first inequality, it suffices to show that the vector S ∈ (R
Since K is the least fixed point of L, the inequality then follows. So let v ∈ V be arbitrary. We will show that
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that the equality does not hold, i.e. that either
If we denote by σ ′′ the strategy that moves from the initial vertex v to v ′ with probability 1 and then starts to behave exactly like the strategy σ ′ , then we obtain
Then there is some δ > 0 and some function f : HR × V → HR such that for every transition v → v ′ and every σ ∈ HR we have
For any strategy σ we denote by p v ′ σ the probability the strategy σ assigns to transition v → v ′ in a game starting in v. Then we can write
For v ∈ V the proof is dual to the proof for v ∈ V , so we omit it. Finally, for v ∈ V we have
This concludes the proof that S is a fixed point of L and thus also the proof of the first inequality in (3). It remains to prove the third inequality in (3) . To this end we prove that for every ε > 0 there is a strategy π ε ∈ HD such that for every v ∈ V we have sup σ∈HR E σ,π ε v ≤ K v + ε. Note that this will also prove the second part of the lemma.
If K v = ∞, then the desired inequality holds trivially for any strategy of player (and particularly for every π ∈ HD ). So assume that K v is finite and fix arbitrary ε > 0. We define the strategy π ε as follows: let wu be any finite path with u ∈ V . Since K is a fixed point of L, there must be a successor u ′ of u such that r(u) + K u ′ ≤ K u + ε/2 |wu|+1 . We set π ε (w) to be a Dirac distribution that selects the transition u → u ′ with probability 1.
We will now prove the following lemma, that not only shows that the strategy π ε has the desired property, but it will also be useful later.
Lemma 12.
Let ε ≥ 0 be arbitrary and let π ε be any deterministic strategy of player that has the following property: for every finite path wu starting in v and ending in u ∈ V , the transition u → u ′ selected by π ε (wu) satisfies r(u)
Proof. We will prove that for every v, every n ∈ N 0 and every strategy σ of player we have E 
In particular, this means that
We proceed by downward induction on k. If n = k, then we trivially have
where the inequality follows from the definition of L. Now suppose that k < n. We distinguish two cases. If v k ∈ V , denote by u the successor of v k chosen by π ε . Then we have
where the inequality on the second line follows from induction hypothesis and the inequality on the third line follows from the definition of π ε .
for some sequence of real numbers (p u ) v k →u s.t. p u ≥ 0 for every u and v k →u p u = 1. By induction hypothesis we have
⊓ ⊔
This finishes the proof of Lemma 5.
B Proof of Lemma 6
Let ε > 0 be arbitrary. It suffices to fix an arbitrary initial vertex v, define choices of the strategy σ ε only on the finite paths starting in v and verify, that the resulting strategy is ε-HR-optimal in v. By repeating this construction for every v ∈ V we obtain a strategy that is ε-HR-optimal in every vertex.
For the sake of better readability, we first present the detailed construction of the deterministic ε-HR-optimal strategy σ ε for games in which the HR-value is finite in every vertex. Almost identical construction can be used for games with arbitrary HRvalues; there are some subtle technical differences that will be presented in the second part of the proof.
We already know that the least fixed point K of the operator L is equal to the vector of HR-values. Moreover, from the standard results of the fixed-point theory (see, e.g., Theorem 5.1 in [13] ) we know that K = L α (0) for some ordinal number α (where 0 is the vector of zeros and where the transfinite iteration of L is defined in a standard way, i.e. we put L β (0) = sup γ<β L γ (0) for every limit ordinal β). The following lemma is instrumental in the construction of σ ε . 
Proof. We define the labeling d inductively, proceeding from the shorter paths to the longer ones. Obviously we set d(v) = α. Now suppose that d(wu) has already been defined. We will define d(wuu ′ ) for all successors u ′ of u simultaneously. First let us assume that d(wu) is a successor ordinal of the form β + 1. Then it suffices to put d(wuu
From the definition of L we can easily see that for every δ > 0 it then holds
so in particular the inequality in (c) holds for wu.
This means that there is
Clearly, we can assume that γ = β + 1 fore some ordinal β. Now we again set d(wuu ′ ) = β for all successors u ′ of u. Using the argument from the previous paragraph with δ = ε/2 |wu|+2 we obtain ⊓ ⊔
We use the labeling d provided by the previous lemma to define the ε-HR-optimal HD strategy σ ε of player . For a given finite path wu the strategy σ ε selects a transition
Such a transition always exists due to the previous lemma. We now prove that the strategy σ ε is ε-HD-optimal in v. We will actually prove a more general statement, that we will reuse later. 
In particular, we have
Proof. We proceed by transfinite induction on d(wu). If d(wu) = 0, then the inequality (4) clearly holds. Now suppose that d(wu) > 0 and that the inequality (4) holds for every β < d(wu). We distinguish three cases depending on the type of u.
(1.) u ∈ V . Denote by u ′ the successor of u selected by σ ε (wu). Then we have 
where the first line is easy, the second line again follows from the induction hypothesis and the third line follows from Lemma 13.
where again the second and the third line follows from induction hypothesis and Lemma 13, respectively.
⊓ ⊔ It remains to show how to handle the case when there are vertices with infinite HR-values. The idea is the same, but the proof is more technical. We need to slightly generalize the previous two lemmas. The following lemma generalizes Lemma 13. We denote by last(w) the last vertex on a nonempty path w. 
and for every wu
where 
then from the previous paragraph we get that (c) holds for wu. If L β+1 (0) u < ∞, then the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 13 shows, that for every δ > 0 the right-hand side of the inequality in (c) is δ-close to L β+1 (0) 0 . If we set δ = 1/ε, we get that (c) holds for wu.
For wu with L d(wu) (0) u < ∞ we can use the same construction as in the Lemma 13.
⊓ ⊔
For every wu let us set
Note that A wu ε − δ ≥ B wu ε for every 0 ≤ δ ≤ ε/2 |wu|+1 . We now define the ε-HR-optimal deterministic strategy σ ε as follows: for a given wu ∈ Fpath(v), the σ(wu) selects a
It remains to prove that σ ε is ε-HR-optimal in v. We generalize Lemma 14 as follows: 
Let v ∈ V be arbitrary. Observe that if every vertex of player has only finitely many successors, then the operator L is Scott-continuous. This finishes the proof of Lemma 11.
D MD-optimal strategies for player
We prove Item 2 of Proposition 8, i.e. the fact that for every -finitely-branching game G there is π ∈ MD such that π is HR-optimal in every vertex. We have already defined π as follows: In every state v ∈ V , the strategy π chooses a successor u minimizing Val HR (u) among all successors of v. But the HR-optimality of this strategy immediately follows from Lemma 12 (note that this lemma works for ε = 0) and Lemma 5 (which says that the least fixed-point K of L is equal to the vector of HR-values).
